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Abstract
Security systems are considered a necessity for the deployment of smart vehicles in our society. Security in vehicular ad
hoc networks is crucial to the reliable exchange of information and control data. In this paper, an intelligent intrusion detection
system (IDS) is proposed to protect the external communication of self-driving and semi self-driving vehicles. This technology
has the ability to detect Denial of Service (DoS) and black hole attacks on VANETs. The advantage of the proposed IDS over
incumbent security systems is that it detects the attack before it causes significant damage. The intrusion prediction technique
is based on a Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA) to predict the attack based on
an observed vehicle behaviour. Simulations utilised Network Simulator version 2 to demonstrate that the IDS exhibits a low
rate of false alarms and high accuracy in detection.
c© 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
KEYWORDS:
Security communication, vehicle ad hoc networks, IDS, self-driving vehicles, linear and quadratic discriminant analysis.
1. Introduction
Self-driving and semi self-driving vehicles are at-
tracting increased attention from both industry and
research community because of their potential posi-
tive and economic effects on society [1]. These vehi-
cles depend heavily on internal and external commu-
nication systems to achieve their goals, such as traffic
safety, ideal exploitation of resources, reducing human
error and reducing the number of injuries and fatalities
from traffic accidents [2]. In other words, autonomous
and semi-autonomous vehicles operate without drivers
and have the ability of improving traffic flow for vehi-
cles on roads and reducing the number of human errors
[3].
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Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) are external
communication systems for these vehicles which sup-
port intelligent transportation systems [4]. VANETs
an play important role in establish secure and safe en-
vironment for self-driving and semi self-driving ve-
hicles [5]. VANETs applications can be classified
into safety and non-safety applications [6]. Real-time
safety applications, fleet management services, traffic
management and monitoring are the most important
features of these networks [7, 8]. Moreover, security
systems are a very important factor for the safe appli-
cation of these vehicles [7]. Strong and reliable secu-
rity mechanisms are needed to protect information as
well as the control data transferred between vehicles
and their Road Side Units (RSUs) in radio coverage
areas [8].
The IDS can be used as an effective tool to know
whether unauthorized users are trying to gain access,
already have access or have compromised the network.
However, when IDS is compared with the wired net-
work, there is an introduction of additional challenges
in setting up an IDS by the dynamic topology of ad hoc
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networks. Traditional security systems are sometime
unable to provide a safe environment and sufficient
protection for sensitive data [1]. Traditional methods
can only identify external attacks and they are unable
to detect and block the internal malicious vehicles. In
order to detect the internal attacks, an intelligent secu-
rity system is proposed that is based on behaviour and
trail data. This data was collected from the trace file to
monitor normal and abnormal behaviour for automo-
bile vehicles. VANETs are a subclass/subtype of mo-
bile ad hoc networks (MANETs) [9]. There have been
some attempts to secure MANETs routing protocol.
For instance, Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector
routing protocol (SEAD) [10], the secure on-demand
routing protocol - Ariadne[11], Authenticated Routing
for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN) [12], Security-Aware
Ad hoc Routing (SAAR) [13], Resiliency Oriented Se-
cure (ROS) [14], Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [15],
Secure AODV (SAODV) [16], Secure Link-State Pro-
tocol (SLSP) [17], Cooperative Security-Enforcement
Routing (CSER) [18]. The above routing schemes
cannot eliminate completely all of the internal (or in-
sider) attacks even if they are implemented correctly.
This is due to attackers already being inside the net-
work with adequate credentials. For instance, a com-
promised mobility node has all the vital cryptographic
keys and can easily launch several types of attacks, for
example grey hole attacks, routing loop attacks and
black hole attacks. Hence, it is also important to de-
velop response and detection techniques for VANETs
that are applicable to the above attacks. Figure 1
shows how communications take place between vehi-
cles and RSUs in a single zone, VANETs allow mobile
vehicles to communicate with other vehicles (V2V)
and with infrastructures on the side road (V2R).
Fig. 1: VANETs Architecture
It is necessary to create an intelligent anomaly intru-
sion detection system (IDS) to secure the routing pro-
tocol on the network layer from potential internal and
external attacks. Thus, the detection of intrusion forms
thus a secondary defence. The IDS can be used as
an effective tool for identifying whether unauthorised
users are trying to gain access, already have access
or have compromised the network. However, when
IDS is compared with wired networks, there are addi-
tional challenges in setting up an intrusion detection
system due to the dynamic topology of ad hoc net-
works. IDS has recently been utilised in the external
communication of vehicles to identify and block any
attacks/threats that target the communication systems.
Decision for the detection frameworks is based on the
current normal and abnormal behaviour of monitored
self-driving vehicles [8], [19], [20]. The contributions
of this paper, are summarised as follows:
• An intelligent IDS system is proposed that
utilises Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and
Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA) to de-
tect anomalies and malicious behaviour for self-
driving and semi self-driving vehicles.
• The proposed security system is not dependent
on extra and expensive hardware such as Radar,
Lidar and computer vision or any RSUs.
Section two a related work in the domain of security
systems in ad hoc network. Section three discusses
intrusion detection systems, Section four explains the
simulation system and Section five describes the sim-
ulation results. Section six discusses our results. Sec-
tion seven conclusion and future works.
2. Related Works
Autonomous vehicles are becoming more open and
connected with the external environment. This devel-
opment increases the possibility of attacks as it en-
courages intruders to launch different types of attacks
on vehicles [6]. These vulnerabilities have direct neg-
ative effects not only on passengers, but also on pedes-
trians around them. The external communication sys-
tem for self-driving and semi self-driving vehicles face
many security problems in the wireless communica-
tion system. The IDS role is collecting traffic data
from the communication system, analysing it and then
identifying/blocking any malicious behaviour in the
VANETs.
The wireless communication system are au-
tonomous vehicles helps to prevent common problem
such as drivers errors. In addition, VANETs sup-
ply critical data and information for emergency case,
warning and notification messages. Hence, security
and privacy are considered very important issue to the
VANETs. Although many previous studies address
problems in VANETs, but there still remain many se-
curity issues that need addressing. Studies such as
Ozgur et al. have employed cognitive techniques to
enhance communication performance in wireless sen-
sor networks [21].
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2.1. Packet Drop Intrusion Detection
Alheeti et al. [22] designed an intelligent intru-
sion detection for securing control data and informa-
tion which are transferred between self-driving vehi-
cles and the infrastructure. Malicious vehicles were
blocked and detected by an IDS in a radio zone.
The detection system was based on the Fuzzy Petri
Nets to create sufficient protection system. In [23],
Uyyala designed an anomaly detection system in se-
cure MANETs for the black hole and grey hole at-
tacks. It could detect and isolate the malicious be-
haviour of nodes. As a result, the authors improved
network performance. In [24], the authors developed
an anomaly detection system to secure the MANETs
from the potential attacks. It was based on Fuzzy
Interface System (FIS) to detect abnormal behaviour
in MANETs. The IDS was capable of identifying
the packet dropping attacks with high accuracy and
low false positive rates. In [25], the adaptive detec-
tion threshold is utilised in design intrusion detection
to identify intelligent abnormal activities in VANETs.
The proposed security system can idenity immediately
any malicious behaviours in VANETs that extracted
from mobile vehicles. Morever, it has the ability to
detect malicious behaviours with high rate of packet
delivery and detection process.
2.2. Routing Protocols
Zaidi [26] presented an intrusion detection system
using a statistical technique to detect a false informa-
tion attack. Traffic models were used to detect rogue
nodes in VANETs. The authors used different types
of parameters, for instance transmission intervals with
a large number of vehicles, to decide between normal
and abnormal behaviour. Ali et al. designed an in-
trusion detection system to protect external communi-
cation of driverless and semi-driverless vehicles [27].
The proposed IDS was based heavily on the features
that had been extracted from the trace file of ns-2.
Support Vector Machines (SVM) and Feed-Forward
Neural Networks (FFNN) were used to build an intel-
ligent IDS that had the ability to detect and block two
common types of attacks, which are: grey hole and
rushing attacks.
Coussement et al. have designed security system to
identify abnormal behaviours that have negative im-
pact on theexternal communication system in mobile
vehicles [28]. The proposed system required to ex-
amin income and outcome communication packets to
detect attacks. It is based on decision making mech-
anism to secure sensitive information of VANETs.
However, two approaches of security are configured
the first one on vehicles whereas the second one on
RSUs. These systems work together to established
groups of mobile nodes based on their speed. More-
over, the proposed security systrm is based on two IDS
schemes and clusterisation of mobile nodes.
2.3. Cross-layer Intrusion Detection
In [29], the authors proposed a cooperative intru-
sion detection to identify black hole attacks. It was
based on the cross-layer architecture: MAC and net-
work layers detection systems used the knowledge of
VANETs and vehicle conditions to determine the ve-
hicle behaviour. The cross-layer security system re-
duced the number of false alarm and enhanced the de-
tection accuracy rate.
Marve et al. proposed an intrusion detection based
on a cross-layer intrusion detection system to detect
DoS and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
at a different layer of the transfer protocol stack [30].
The authors were able to design a security system to
provide sufficient protection for nodes in MANETs
while reducing the number of false alarms.
In [31] the authors propose a cross-layer architec-
ture in building IDS that had the ability to detect the
malicious nodes and different types of DoS attacks.
In addition, the proposed anomaly detection could de-
tect different kinds of sink hole attacks and flooding
attacks in an efficient way.
Akyildiz et al. proposed a novel technology to fix
common problems for wireless networks which is xG
networks. The proposed system had the ability to im-
prove communication performance by increase avail-
able spectrum and improve efficiency in spectrum con-
sumption [32].
Since autonomous technology is a relatively newer
concept, more research and proposals should be done
to prove its effectiveness and applicability. Security
and privacy must be taken into consideration to ensure
the success of self-driving and semi-self-driving vehi-
cles. In our research, a security system is proposed
to protect the external network of these vehicles from
common attacks such as: DoS, black hole and grey
hole attacks. It is based on the features of the trace file
that have been generated from ns-2.
3. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) Overview
Typically, VANETs have two security layers [33].
These are suggested to protect internal and exter-
nal communication systems of these vehicles in au-
tonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles: Intrusion
Prevention Systems (IPS) and IDS [34]. Security mea-
sures are now a serious topic in automotive systems
since the first layer does not have the capacity to pro-
vide enough security [35].
Additionally, the external communication of these
vehicles can provide a variety of services like safety
and non-safety applications which aid the increasing
research efforts and growing interest in security sys-
tems. IDS is seen as one of the ways of protecting
VANETs, as it can detect malicious or abnormal ac-
tivity on the host or network [36]. It has the capacity
to delivers enough security and privacy to systems or
networks since they play a vital role in identifying and
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preventing internal attacks which cannot be identified
or blocked by other security methods. Moreover, some
studies have confirmed that IDS are effective in detect-
ing any unauthorised access [37].
3.1. IDS Categories
IDS can be categorised in different ways; how-
ever, the major classification is: misuse, anomaly, and
specifications detection systems [38]. Each detection
method possesses some qualities that separate it from
others, whether positive or negative. Yet, all these
methods try to provide adequate security, prevent any
unauthorised access, and detect all unauthorised ac-
cess from malicious vehicles or nodes [38].
• Signature-based system - This type of detection
technique involves a security system which con-
tains a database of the behaviour of possible at-
tacks. This data set can be compared to the be-
haviour of the system and intrusion can be de-
tected when there is a match.
• Anomaly-based system - This detection system
depends on behaviour which is already known.
There is an intrusion if the system detects any
deviation from this behaviour. Moreover, the sys-
tem depends on a profile which is developed from
the normal behaviour of the network.
• Specifications-based system - This detection sys-
tem can be said to be a set of conditions whose
availability in the protocol or program is neces-
sary. The intruder can be detected when these
conditions are not met.
There are many mechanisms that can be utilised in
the protection of the communication system of self-
driving and semi-self-driving vehicles, but we have
chosen IDS because: It is designed to detect internal
attacks, which is an advantage over conventional secu-
rity mechanisms such as cryptographic methods which
cannot detect internal attacks. In our paper, we pro-
pose intelligent IDSs which depend on the behaviours
of vehicles that are collected from the trace file. The
trace file is generated from the ns-2.
The proposed IDS is deployed on each vehicle that
plays an important role in detecting external/internal
attacks on the VANETs of self-driving and semi-self-
driving vehicles without the need for additional hard-
ware.
4. The Proposed Scheme
The intelligent proposed IDS first generates the ma-
licious behaviour for self-driving vehicles. The net-
work simulator requires tools to establish a realis-
tic world of abnormal and normal behaviours for au-
tonomous vehicles. In other words, the mobility and
traffic model are generated in the early step of the pro-
posed IDS. The overall architecture of the proposed
intrusion detection system is shown in Figure 2. The
security system requires a series of processing steps
that are explained below.
Fig. 2: VANETs Architecture
The proposed IDS is heavily based on behaviour
features that have been extracted from the trace file.
It is generated from the ns-2 that reflect vehicles be-
haviour wheather normal or malicious. The extracted
features require pre-processing phase to prepare it to
the training phase for LDA and QDA such as encod-
ing, normalisation and uniform distribution. In this
case, the extracted dataset is ready to train and test
phases for LDA and QDA.
4.1. Establish Abnormal Behaviour
Here, a malicious vehicle behaviour is added in ns-2
utilising the VANETs - Ad hoc On-Demand Distance
Vector Routing (AODV) routing protocol. In this se-
curity system, new routing protocol which is VANETs
- AODV that is utilised to evaluate the performance
of the proposed IDS. The generated behaviour of a
mobility node is called a DoS vehicle when it makes
network resources unavailable to rightful users in the
VANETs.
In order to generate DoS behaviour in VANETs,
we need to modify and reformulate some internal pa-
rameters of the two files in the routing protocol. In
other words, two files of AODV-VANETs are needed
to modify and establish the malicious behaviour which
are: VANETs - AODV.cc and VANETs - AODV.h. In
addition, the TCL scenario for VANETs requires to
add a few lines of code for simulating this behaviour
under certain condition such as: ns-2 at specific time
[vehicle number n set DoS]. The malicious vehicle is
an abnormal entity which will drop the router pack-
ets. In addition, the malicious scenario needs updating
and changing to some functions in the TCL program
to run DoS functions that were established in VANETs
- AODV files.
4.2. Create Mobility and Traffic Scenarios
In this research, ns-2 is employed to evaluate the
overall performance of the proposed system and to
calculate the amount of false alarms generated from
Using Discriminant Analysis to Detect Malicious Vehicles in External Communication of Self-Driving Vehicles 5
it. ns-2 requires software to generate a realistic envi-
ronment of malicious and normal behaviours for self-
driving vehicles by providing two types of inputs traf-
fic and mobility scenarios which are: Simulation of
Urban Mobility Model (SUMO) and MObilty VEhi-
cles (MOVE) [39]-[40]. These tools allow ns-2 simu-
late successfully the external communications of these
vehicles within the different scenarios.
SUMO is considered an efficient mobility program
that has been used in generating a real environment in
VANETs [41]. In addition, SUMO provides efficient
computation even with city and downtown scenarios,
i.e. with large number of vehicles [41]. MOVE is
based on SUMO [41]. It obtains the output file gen-
erated in SUMO by converting them to ns-2. Bushra
et al. presented a comprehensive survey of wireless
communication in urban areas. The authors classify
all urban application scenarios that were employed in
desgin mobility system in urban area [42]. The Man-
hattan urban mobility model is utilised in designing
the mobility and traffic scenario for self-driving ve-
hicles, which is widely adopted in scientific research
[43]. Figure 3 below presents the traffic and mobility
scenario for driverless vehicles.
Fig. 3: Traffic and Mobility Scenario
The mobility and traffic model of the self-driving
and semi-autonomous vehicles is shown in figure 3.
It describes the communication between vehicles and
with RSUs in that radio coverage area. The Manhattan
mobility model is utilised in design for some reasons,
such as flexibility and common used in VANETs.
4.3. Features from the Trace File
The trace file describes all events and actions of ve-
hicles communication in VANET. In contrast, the pro-
posed security system is based on the features which
have been extracted from the trace file [44]. The pro-
posed security system is based on the features ex-
tracted from the trace file of the ns-2. In general,
the trace file is divided into three subset files which
are: basic trace, internet protocol trace and VANETs -
AODV trace [41]. However, the performance and effi-
ciency of the detection system depend heavily on the
type and number of the extracted features. To evaluate
the efficiency of the detection system, we used all the
21 features of the trace file that reflect behaviour of a
mobility node on the street [1].
The proposed IDS are based on Linear Discriminant
Analysis (LDA) and Quadratic Discriminant Analy-
sis (QDA) which have the ability to learn normal and
malicious behaviour through the training phase. Ulti-
mately reducing the cost and enhancing real-time de-
tection are considered a main motivation for utilizing
the artificial intelligence in building intelligent IDS
[45].
4.4. Linear and Quadratic Discriminant Analysis
Discriminant methods, whether linear or quadratic,
are efficiently and mathematically robust and they of-
ten create classification systems whose precision is as
good as more complex methods [46]. The work princi-
ple of an LDA is based on Bayes optimal classifier and
a linear separating hyper plane is employed in basic
classification between classes in LDA [47]. Equation
1 shows the linear discriminant function [47]:
dk(χ) = 2µTk
1−∑
k
χ − µ−1k µk − 2 log pi(k) (1)
where: k representes normal and abnormal classes, pik
is prior probability, χ is set of measurements,
∑
k is
convariance matrix and µk is mean vector. The QDA
is considered a generalised version of LDA and it can
discriminate only two classes of points [48]. The dis-
criminant function of LDA is used for the QDA after
multiplied by -2 as shown in Equation 2 [49]:
dk(χ) = (χ − µk)T ∑−1k (χ − µk) + log |∑k | − 2 log pik (2)
The discriminant rule of QDA is shown in Equation 3
[50]:
dk(χ) = min
1≤k≤k
dk(χ)⇔ max
1≤k≤k
p(χ/k) (3)
where, p(χ/k) posterior distribution. The training and
testing phases are applied on the experimental section.
4.5. Fuzzification of the Data
The extracted features have direct impact on the per-
formance of the proposed security system. In other
words, the number and type of features play vital role
on the detection rate and the number of false alarms.
The dataset of security system suffers from common
classification problems such as, the normal and mali-
cious vehicles is not obvious from the extracted fea-
tures, or they do not draws clear line border between
normal and abnormal. In this case, the optimal solu-
tion is fuzzification model on extracted dataset from
ns-2. In this paper, a mathematical model is designed
to redistribute the features and cope with ambiguity.
However, the mathematical model is proposed to
address the classification problem [51]. In the previ-
ous study, security system is designed without fuzzifi-
cation model and we got a false alarm rate of 12.24
but after incorporating fuzzifcation we obtain 0.17
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[52]. Each feature value was distributed in five val-
ues in equation 4 with a range in [0.1] which are: low,
medium low, medium, medium high and high.
f (x, a, b, c) = max(min((x − a)/(b − a), (c − x)/(c − b)), 0) (4)
where x is the feature value while a, b and c represent
the values of the fuzzy domain. The fuzzifcation IDS
can increase the detection rate of the proposed IDS
while reducing the number of false alarms at the same
time.
4.6. Network Simulator Parameters and Environment
In this paper, the communication system of self-
driving vehicles is built on the ns-2. The network
simulator is designed to simulate wired and wireless
networks [39]. However, the designers faced prob-
lems in simulating the external communications of
self-driving vehicles with ns-2. A major reason for
this is that the basic ns-2 simulator has not been de-
signed to support the simulation of VANETS. It was
problematic for the designers to simulate the VANETS
of self-driving with ns-2 because of the unavailability
of ns-2. In this case, extra tools are employed with ns-
2 for simulating VANETs for self-driving and semi-
self-driving vehicles. These software are SUMO and
MOVE [53]. The ns-2, traffic and mobility systems
are utilised to achieve the intelligent intrusion detec-
tion system for the external communication system in
the real world. In this proposal, the communication
environment is compsed of 30 cars and six RSUs [39].
4.7. The Proposed Intelligent Detection System
The proposed security system is utilised by/in LDA
and QDA to protect the external communication sys-
tem for self-driving and semi self-driving vehicles. It
has the ability to distinguish between normal and ma-
licious communication between vehicles and RSUs.
The proposed IDS has six stages as following:
• Stage I (Generate the traffic and the mobility
model): At this stage, SUMO and MOVE are em-
ployed to generate the suitable scenarios for ns-2.
The SUMO and MOVE output files are consid-
ered input files for the next step.
• Stage II (network simulator): The behaviour for
vehicles whether normal or abnormal is gener-
ated to simulate vehicles. Two output files are
obtained at this stage which are trace and Net-
work Animator (NAM) files. The features are ex-
tracted from the trace file that has been generated
from the ns-2.
• Stage III (Data collection and pre-processing): At
this stage, the trace file is utilised to extracted
communication features for vehicles. In addition,
the extracted features are pre-processed by trans-
forming them to numeric values and the values
were normalized to values betweenn 0 and 1 ac-
cording to the equation 5:
X =
X − min
max − min (5)
Normalising data often permits to enhance the
performance of LDA and QDA as well as increas-
ing detection rate.
• Stage IV (Fuzzification): The fuzzy set is em-
ployed to convert the extracted features to their
fuzzified counterparts to fix classification prob-
lem and dataset overlap.
• Stage V (Training phase): LDA and QDA are
trained with the extracted dataset. The raw
dataset is divided into six subsets, each subset
containing ten thousand records. For each iter-
ation of the training cycle, the proposed system
is used a different subset in this phase.
• Stage VI (Testing phase): At this stage, the pro-
posed IDS is tested with different subset to calcu-
late the detection rate and number of false alarms.
The testing phase has the ability to calculate per-
formance metrics for this system.
5. Expermental Results
In this paper, the detection system can identify nor-
mal or abnormal/malicious behaviour through the pro-
posed security system. We need real data that reflects
behaviour whether normal or abnormal between vehi-
cles and their RSUs, to evaluate performance of the
proposed IDS. To obtain real data, we need to gener-
ate two kinds of scenarios and simulate these under
certain conditions. This raw data is generated from
the trace file that was generated from the ns-2. These
features describe the normal and abnormal behaviours
of self-driving and semi self-driving vehicles.The ini-
tial parameters used in this proposal could be essential
part in ns-2. In other words, the behaviour and perfor-
mance in ns-2 are heavily based on these parameters.
Table 1 lists the parameters are utilised in this security
system.
Using Discriminant Analysis to Detect Malicious Vehicles in External Communication of Self-Driving Vehicles 7
Table 1: Simulator Environment and Parameters
5.1. Performance Metrics
To measure the efficiency and the effectiveness of
the proposed IDS, we need to calculate some perfor-
mance metrics. They are mainly divided into three
classes [54], namely:
• Ranking metric: In this metric, we calculate four
types of alarms which are: True Positive TP,
False Positive FPk, True Negative TN and False
Negative FN. Moreover, Precision Rate PR and
Detection Rate DR are calculated in this type of
the metric. The accuracy of the system result is
be calculated as follows [27]:
Accuracy = Numbero f correctlyclassi f iedpatternsTotalnumbero f patterns (6)
In addition, the measures will be calculated
as follows [55]: Let TP=normal connection
record classified as normal TN=attack connec-
tion record classified as attack FP=normal con-
nection record classified as attack FN=attack
connection record classified as normal: then
T PRate(sensitivty) =
T P
T P + FN
(7)
T NRate(speci f icity) =
T N
T N + FP
(8)
FNRate = (1 − sensitivty) = FNFN + T P (9)
FPRate = (1 − speci f icity) = FPFP + T N (10)
DR =
Correctlydetectedattacks
Totalnumbero f attacks
(11)
DR =
T P + T N
T P + T N + FP + FN
PR =
T P
T P + FP
(12)
• Threshold metric: Classification Rate CR and F-
Measure FM are calculated in these metrics. The
FM value lies in the range from 0 to 1. It is used
to give threshold as well as it is the mean of the
PR and Recall. In addition, Recall metric is the
missing part of the PR. In other words, it is equiv-
alent to the DR.
CR =
Correctlyclassi f iedinstances
Totalnumbero f instances
(13)
CR =
T P
T P + FN
FM =
2
1
PR +
1
Recall
(14)
• Probability metric: Calculating Root Mean
Square Error RMSE. The best way to explain
classification results is a confusion matrix, by
evaluating the performance of the proposed in-
telligent IDS [27].
• Packet Delivery Rate (PDR): The PDR value is
ratio between send packets from source vehicle
and received packets at destination vehicle.
PDR =
∑
Numbero f packetsreceived∑
Numbero f packetsS ent
(15)
8 Khattab M. Ali Alheeti, et al.
• Throughput: The total number of packets which
exchanged in the VANETs. It is utilised to mea-
sure the effectiveness of the routing protocol.
Throughput = Numbero f received∗packetssizeS imulationT ime (16)
• End-to-end Delay:It is based on time to calcu-
lated the average packet delay. In other words,
this metric is the average time to reach the secnd
packets from the source node to the destination
node.
End − to − endDelay =
∑
EndTime−S tartT ime∑
Numbero f connections (17)
5.2. Training and Testing LDA-IDS and QDA-IDS to
detect Malicious Behaviour
The extracted features are utilised in the training
and testing phase for the proposed anomaly detection
system. We have used a 100-fold cross-validation to
decrease the bias related to the random splitting of the
data set into training phase and testing phase. The se-
curity system must be able to detect novel and existing
attacks. The obtained classification rate for LDA and
QDA, time and error rate are as shown in Table 2:
Table 2: Classification Rate
In Table 3, we determine four types of alarms: TP,
FP, TN and FN for the proposed security system.
Table 3: Alarm Rate
In addition, we need to determine some extra per-
formance metrics for each of the proposed IDS which
are LDA-IDS and QDA-IDS for evaluation of their
performance individually. The Classification Rate CR,
Detection Rate DR, Precision Rate PR, F-Measure
FM, P-value and mean error are calculated in Table
4.
Table 4: Performance Metrics
The P-value is calculated to measure the difference
rate between the LDA and QDA as shown in Table 4.
This value indicates that there is a significant differ-
ence between the error of the two methods.
The Packet Delivery Rate (PDR) and End-to-end
delay are explained in table 5. It is easily observe the
security system in providing safety and security envi-
ronment of VANETs.
Table 5: Comparison Performance
6. Discussion
The motivation behind this paper is to design an in-
telligent IDS that provides a secure environment for
autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles. The IDS
has the ability to detect abnormal behaviour and take
actions to prevent attacks on the network, vehicle and
the passengers. In the absence of this IDS, the security
of the system cannot be certified. The proposed secu-
rity system was implemented in eight phases: gener-
ating the mobility and traffic model, the ns-2, the trace
file, data collection and pre-processing, training and
testing for the LDA, training and testing for the QDA
and comparing the performance of the two types of
proposed intelligent security system.
In order to evaluate the performance detection for
the proposed security system, we need to compare our
proposed IDS with the previous work that achieved er-
ror rate, of 2.05 [1], 10 [28] and 19 [25], whereas in
the security system presented here, we can get a 0.58
error detection rate. The average of false alarm that
was generated in [1] is 12.24, while we have achieved
9.91 with this security system. Figure 4 shows the per-
formance comparsion between our proposed security
system with the previous work.
Figure 4 shows the comparison of performance be-
tween the LDA and QDA. The error rate for the LDA-
IDS was 0.385. In this paper, the TP and TN alarms
rate fluctuated between 86.44 and 92.73 with excel-
lent and efficient accuracy. On the other hand, the FN
alarm rate was accepted at about 7.27 which is a good
indicator of the design results.
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Fig. 4: performance compare between LDA and QDA
The error rate for the QDA-IDS was 0.397. The
TP and TN alarms rate fluctuated between 84.55 and
87.44 with efficient accuracy. On the other hand,
the FN alarm rate was somewhat high at about 12.56
which is an accepted indicator of the design results.
We could enhance the detection rate for the proposed
security system by using LDA and QDA that creates
flexibility in selecting the security system that is more
efficient with different conditions.
According to the experimental results section, we
can easily observe that the LDA-IDS is more efficient
and effective in the detection of abnormal behaviour
for vehicles with a low false negative alarm rate than
QDA-IDS.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed a reliable IDS to
detect the malicious behaviour in the communication
system for the self-driving and semi self-driving ve-
hicles. The proposed IDS can detect abnormal be-
haviour and take actions to prevent an attack on the
network, vehicle and the passengers. It is considered
a prediction scheme to secure the external communi-
cation system for autonomous systems. The proposed
LDA-IDS has the ability to distinguish and identify
the actions of a malignant vehicle. It is considered a
novel protection system to secure the external commu-
nication system because this is the first work that has
employed abnormal behaviour prediction for securing
VANETs.
Our proposed IDS can identify and block DoS and
black hole attacks by monitoring the routing table and
analysis of the trace file that has been generated from
ns-2. The generated trace file defines the behaviours of
the VANETs through the data control and information
that were sent, received, forwarded and dropped in
packets. Meanwhile, QDA has a higher error rate than
LDA. Thus, we demonstrate that a simpler algorithm -
LDA may yield better performance than a more com-
plicated algorithm - QDA. The LDA and QDA make
the proposed IDS more efficient in securing VANETs.
A possible further extension of the security system
is to enhance RSUs with intelligent IDS and vehicles
with AI techniques such as k-Nearest Neighbors algo-
rithm (kNN).
Acknowledgements
This research has been supported by the Engineer-
ing and Physical Sciences Research Council(EPSRC)
Grant EP/K004638/1 (project named RoBoSAS).
References
[1] K. M. A. Alheeti, A. Gruebler, K. D. McDonald-Maier, An
intrusion detection system against malicious attacks on the
communication network of driverless cars, in: 2015 12th An-
nual IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Con-
ference (CCNC), IEEE, 2015, pp. 916–921.
[2] M. O. Cherif, Optimization of v2v and v2i communications in
an operated vehicular network, France (2010) PhD thesis.
[3] Y. Saleem, M. H. Rehmani, S. Zeadally, Integration of cogni-
tive radio technology with unmanned aerial vehicles: issues,
opportunities, and future research challenges, Journal of Net-
work and Computer Applications 50 (2015) 15–31.
[4] M. O. Cherif, S.-M. Senouci, B. Ducourthial, Efficient data
dissemination in cooperative vehicular networks, Wireless
Communications and Mobile Computing 13 (12) (2013)
1150–1160.
[5] T. Umer, M. Amjad, N. Shah, Z. Ding, Modeling vehicles mo-
bility for connectivity analysis in vanet, in: Intelligent Trans-
portation Systems, Springer, 2016, pp. 221–239.
[6] H. Sedjelmaci, T. Bouali, S. M. Senouci, Detection and pre-
vention from misbehaving intruders in vehicular networks, in:
2014 IEEE Global Communications Conference, IEEE, 2014,
pp. 39–44.
[7] H. Sedjelmaci, S. M. Senouci, A new intrusion detection
framework for vehicular networks, in: 2014 IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Communications (ICC), IEEE, 2014, pp.
538–543.
[8] H. Sedjelmaci, S. M. Senouci, M. Feham, An efficient intru-
sion detection framework in cluster-based wireless sensor net-
works, Security and Communication Networks 6 (10) (2013)
1211–1224.
[9] S. Yousefi, M. S. Mousavi, M. Fathy, Vehicular ad hoc net-
works (vanets): challenges and perspectives, in: 2006 6th
International Conference on ITS Telecommunications, IEEE,
2006, pp. 761–766.
[10] Y.-C. Hu, D. B. Johnson, A. Perrig, Sead: Secure efficient
distance vector routing for mobile wireless ad hoc networks,
Ad hoc networks 1 (1) (2003) 175–192.
[11] Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, D. B. Johnson, Ariadne: A secure on-
demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks, Wireless net-
works 11 (1-2) (2005) 21–38.
[12] K. Sanzgiri, B. Dahill, B. N. Levine, C. Shields, E. M.
Belding-Royer, A secure routing protocol for ad hoc networks,
in: Network Protocols, 2002. Proceedings. 10th IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on, IEEE, 2002, pp. 78–87.
[13] S. Yi, P. Naldurg, R. Kravets, Security-aware ad hoc routing
for wireless networks, in: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM inter-
national symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & comput-
ing, ACM, 2001, pp. 299–302.
[14] A. A. Pirzada, C. McDonald, Secure routing protocols for mo-
bile ad hoc wireless networks, Advanced Wired and Wireless
Networks.
[15] P. Papadimitratos, Z. J. Haas, Secure routing for mobile ad
hoc networks, in: the SCS Commnication Networks and
Distributed Systems Modeling and Simulation Conference
(CNDS), San Antonio, TX, January 27-31, 2002, 2002, pp.
193–204.
[16] M. G. Zapata, Secure ad hoc on-demand distance vector rout-
ing, ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing and Communica-
tions Review 6 (3) (2002) 106–107.
[17] P. Papadimitratos, Z. J. Haas, Secure link state routing for mo-
bile ad hoc networks, in: Applications and the Internet Work-
shops, 2003. Proceedings. 2003 Symposium on, IEEE, 2003,
pp. 379–383.
10 Khattab M. Ali Alheeti, et al.
[18] B. Lu, U. W. Pooch, Cooperative security-enforcement rout-
ing in mobile ad hoc networks, in: Mobile and Wireless Com-
munications Network, 2002. 4th International Workshop on,
IEEE, 2002, pp. 157–161.
[19] S. S. Doumit, D. P. Agrawal, Self-organized criticality and
stochastic learning based intrusion detection system for wire-
less sensor networks, in: Military Communications Confer-
ence, 2003. MILCOM’03. 2003 IEEE, Vol. 1, IEEE, 2003,
pp. 609–614.
[20] S. Shin, T. Kwon, G.-Y. Jo, Y. Park, H. Rhy, An experimental
study of hierarchical intrusion detection for wireless industrial
sensor networks, IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
6 (4) (2010) 744–757.
[21] O. B. Akan, O. B. Karli, O. Ergul, Cognitive radio sensor net-
works, IEEE network 23 (4) (2009) 34–40.
[22] K. M. A. Alheeti, A. Gruebler, K. D. McDonald-Maier,
A. Fernando, Prediction of dos attacks in external communi-
cation for self-driving vehicles using a fuzzy petri net model,
in: 2016 IEEE International Conference on Consumer Elec-
tronics (ICCE), IEEE, 2016, pp. 502–503.
[23] A. Mitrokotsa, R. Mavropodi, C. Douligeris, Intrusion detec-
tion of packet dropping attacks in mobile ad hoc networks,
in: Proceedings of the International Conference on Intelligent
Systems And Computing: Theory And Applications, 2006,
pp. 111–118.
[24] A. Chaudhary, V. Tiwari, A. Kumar, Design an anomaly based
fuzzy intrusion detection system for packet dropping attack in
mobile ad hoc networks, in: Advance Computing Conference
(IACC), 2014 IEEE International, IEEE, 2014, pp. 256–261.
[25] C. A. Kerrache, A. Lakas, N. Lagraa, Detection of intelligent
malicious and selfish nodes in vanet using threshold adap-
tive control, in: Electronic Devices, Systems and Applica-
tions (ICEDSA), 2016 5th International Conference on, IEEE,
2016, pp. 1–4.
[26] K. Zaidi, M. Milojevic, V. Rakocevic, A. Nallanathan, M. Ra-
jarajan, Host based intrusion detection for vanets: A statistical
approach to rogue node detection.
[27] K. M. A. Alheeti, A. Gruebler, K. D. McDonald-Maier, On the
detection of grey hole and rushing attacks in self-driving ve-
hicular networks, in: Computer Science and Electronic Engi-
neering Conference (CEEC), 2015 7th, IEEE, 2015, pp. 231–
236.
[28] R. Coussement, B. Amar Bensaber, I. Biskri, Decision support
protocol for intrusion detection in vanets, in: Proceedings of
the third ACM international symposium on Design and anal-
ysis of intelligent vehicular networks and applications, ACM,
2013, pp. 31–38.
[29] R. Baiad, H. Otrok, S. Muhaidat, J. Bentahar, Coopera-
tive cross layer detection for blackhole attack in vanet-olsr,
in: 2014 International Wireless Communications and Mobile
Computing Conference (IWCMC), IEEE, 2014, pp. 863–868.
[30] T. K. Marve, N. U. Sambhe, A review on cross layer intrusion
detection system in wireless ad hoc network, in: Electrical,
Computer and Communication Technologies (ICECCT), 2015
IEEE International Conference on, IEEE, 2015, pp. 1–4.
[31] R. Shrestha, K.-H. Han, D.-Y. Choi, S.-J. Han, A novel cross
layer intrusion detection system in manet, in: 2010 24th IEEE
International Conference on Advanced Information Network-
ing and Applications, IEEE, 2010, pp. 647–654.
[32] I. F. Akyildiz, W.-Y. Lee, M. C. Vuran, S. Mohanty, Next gen-
eration/dynamic spectrum access/cognitive radio wireless net-
works: a survey, Computer networks 50 (13) (2006) 2127–
2159.
[33] R. H. S. driving Car Sensors, Researcher hacks self-
driving car sensors, http://spectrum.ieee.org/cars-
that-think/transportation/self-driving/researcher-hacks-
selfdriving-car-sensors (March 2015).
[34] G. Samara, W. A. Al-Salihy, R. Sures, Security issues and
challenges of vehicular ad hoc networks (vanet), in: New
Trends in Information Science and Service Science (NISS),
2010 4th International Conference on, IEEE, 2010, pp. 393–
398.
[35] M. N. Mejri, J. Ben-Othman, M. Hamdi, Survey on vanet se-
curity challenges and possible cryptographic solutions, Vehic-
ular Communications 1 (2) (2014) 53–66.
[36] D. Tian, Y. Wang, G. Lu, G. Yu, A vehicular ad hoc networks
intrusion detection system based on busnet, in: Future Com-
puter and Communication (ICFCC), 2010 2nd International
Conference on, Vol. 1, IEEE, 2010, pp. V1–225.
[37] R. Bronte, H. Shahriar, H. M. Haddad, A signature-based in-
trusion detection system for web applications based on genetic
algorithm, in: Proceedings of the 9th International Conference
on Security of Information and Networks, ACM, 2016, pp.
32–39.
[38] Y. Ping, J. Xinghao, W. Yue, L. Ning, Distributed intrusion
detection for mobile ad hoc networks, Journal of systems en-
gineering and electronics 19 (4) (2008) 851–859.
[39] T. N. S. ns 2, The network simulator - ns-2,
www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns (June 2014).
[40] J. Harri, F. Filali, C. Bonnet, Mobility models for vehicular ad
hoc networks: a survey and taxonomy, IEEE Communications
Surveys & Tutorials 11 (4) (2009) 19–41.
[41] C. . C. C. Consortium, Car 2 car communication consortium,
www.car-2-car.org/index.php?id=5 (June 2011).
[42] B. Rashid, M. H. Rehmani, Applications of wireless sensor
networks for urban areas: a survey, Journal of Network and
Computer Applications 60 (2016) 192–219.
[43] J. Breu, A. Brakemeier, M. Menth, Analysis of cooperative
awareness message rates in vanets, in: ITS Telecommunica-
tions (ITST), 2013 13th International Conference on, IEEE,
2013, pp. 8–13.
[44] S. Chettibi, Y. Labeni, A. Boulkour, Trace file analyzer for ad
hoc routing protocols simulation with ns2, in: New Technolo-
gies of Information and Communication (NTIC), 2015 First
International Conference on, IEEE, 2015, pp. 1–6.
[45] Using artificial intelligence to create a low cost self-
driving car, http://budisteanu.net/Download/ISEF 20220Au-
tonomous20car20 Doc20particle.pdf (Jule 2015).
[46] T. Rasymas, V. Rudzˇionis, Evaluation of methods to combine
different speech recognizers, in: Computer Science and Infor-
mation Systems (FedCSIS), 2015 Federated Conference on,
IEEE, 2015, pp. 1043–1047.
[47] D. S., Statistical data mining and machine learning, Tech. rep.,
Department of Statistics Oxford (2016).
[48] S. Bhattacharyya, A. Khasnobish, S. Chatterjee, A. Konar,
D. Tibarewala, Performance analysis of lda, qda and knn al-
gorithms in left-right limb movement classification from eeg
data, in: Systems in Medicine and Biology (ICSMB), 2010
International Conference on, IEEE, 2010, pp. 126–131.
[49] S. H. Baek, D.-H. Park, H. Bozdogan, Hybrid kernel density
estimation for discriminant analysis with information com-
plexity and genetic algorithm, Knowledge-Based Systems 99
(2016) 79–91.
[50] J. H. Friedman, Regularized discriminant analysis, Journal of
the American statistical association 84 (405) (1989) 165–175.
[51] G. Chen, T. T. Pham, Introduction to fuzzy sets, fuzzy logic,
and fuzzy control systems, CRC press, 2000.
[52] K. M. A. Alheeti, A. Gruebler, K. D. McDonald-Maier, An
intrusion detection system against black hole attacks on the
communication network of self-driving cars, in: 2015 Sixth
International Conference on Emerging Security Technologies
(EST), IEEE, 2015, pp. 86–91.
[53] K.-c. Lan, C.-M. Chou, Realistic mobility models for vehicu-
lar ad hoc network (vanet) simulations, in: ITS Telecommu-
nications, 2008. ITST 2008. 8th International Conference on,
IEEE, 2008, pp. 362–366.
[54] R. Caruana, A. Niculescu-Mizil, Data mining in metric space:
an empirical analysis of supervised learning performance cri-
teria, in: Proceedings of the tenth ACM SIGKDD interna-
tional conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining,
ACM, 2004, pp. 69–78.
[55] G. Creech, J. Hu, A semantic approach to host-based intrusion
detection systems using contiguousand discontiguous system
call patterns, IEEE Transactions on Computers 63 (4) (2014)
807–819.
